Introduction
Wittgenstein's interpreters are practically undivided that method plays a central role in his philosophy. This comes as no surprise if we bear in mind the Tractarian dictum: "philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity".
1
After 1929, Wittgenstein's method evolved further. In its final form, articulated in Philosophical Investigations, it was formulated as different kinds of therapies of specific philosophical problems that torment our life.
2 But how did Wittgenstein reach that conception?
In order to answer this question, we shall follow the changes in Wittgenstein's thinking in four subsequent phases and in three dimensions: (i) in logic and ontology; (ii) in method proper; (iii) in style.
What are the Tractarian Elucidations?
In order to answer this question, we will review the ways in which we speak about elucidations in life and in ordinary language.
We typically need elucidations when we are confronted with a new appliance (a new gadget). The elucidations tell us how it functions. When we have already learned how the gadget (the logical symbolism, in this case) works, we can throw away the instructions of how to use it. In contrast, science suggests explanations.
Special cases of elucidation are the textbooks that teach us how to speak a foreign language. If we want to learn Portuguese, for example, we will buy ourselves a textbook of instructions that will teach us to speak that language which already exists in the literature and on the streets of Luanda, Lisbon and Rio. If, in some point of time, we have already learned to speak that language, we can throw our "book of elucidations" away.
In short, our thesis is that in a similar way Wittgenstein's Tractatus teaches -trains -its reader to better see how the propositions of science logically relate one to another, how the logic of our everyday language functions, and how logic itself functions. In this way, it serves as a "logical clarification of thoughts" 7 and develops our skill of thinking. Tractarian propositions, however, have no proper content -"no existential import". Indeed, similar to the learning Portuguese example, human thinking is already there. The thinking-training must not invent it; it just teaches us how to make better use of it.
This interpretation of the Tractarian elucidations fits perfectly well into the description of its propositions as a ladder. To be sure:
(1) We typically throw away the instrument of training after we have reached a new level of command of a certain skill -we have no interest in the instrument which brought us up to that level.
(2) What is important with such instruments is not their content but their form. Perhaps another person might construct a different type of instrument, with the help of which we will be trained in the same skill. In this sense, the propositions of the Tractatus do not express something necessary; they are contingent. Diamond is especially insistent on this point. Unfortunately, she drew from it false conclusions: the propositions of the Tractatus are gibberish.
Furthermore, we discern three types of Tractarian elucidations:
(i) First of all, Wittgenstein's New Symbolism elucidates all problems of the old logic, including Frege's and Russell's. When we construct graphically (geometrically) correct symbols, all problems of logic are eo ipso resolved. Hence, "we cannot make mistakes in logic". 8 Moreover, all superfluous entities in logic and philosophy such as logical constants and logical objects will be put in brackets. A consequence of the latter position was Wittgenstein's belief that there are no propositions of logic and also no logical truths. Logical propositions are tautologies -a position that can be called a "redundancy theory of logic".
(ii) More importantly, the New Logical Symbolism elucidates being a means (an instrument) for recognizing (clarifying) the logical properties of all available propositions of science and everyday life.
(iii) Besides propositions that set out the New Symbolism, there are also Tractarian propositions that are elucidations of this Symbolism. Moreover, these propositions form the bulk of the book.
Tractarian Ontology as Logic
The leading motive behind the conception of Diamond and Conant is the denial that the Tractatus advances metaphysical truths. But our interpretation of the Tractarian method also eschews any metaphysical assumption. In fact, there is no "Tractarian metaphysics". But what about the numerous "ontological propositions" of the Tractatus, for example, TLP 1-2.063?
In order to answer this question, we will turn back to David Pears who has noted that the logic of the Tractatus is "approximately Aristotelian.
[…] The forms revealed by logic are embedded in one and only one world of facts". 9 In other words, Tractarian logic and ontology are identical, an identity best shown in the fact that the general logical form (or the "general form of truth-function") 10 is identical with the general form of compositionality: "such and such is the case".
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The identity between logic and ontology finds expression in two ways: (ii) "In the picture and the pictured there must be something identical in order that the one can be a picture of the other at all". 13 Apparently, Tractarian ontology is a part of Wittgenstein's new Conceptual Notation. Moreover, Tractarian logic can be seen as built up with the help of ontological elements: objects, facts, indefinables -points that the plain man knows quite well.
14 In this way, the elucidation of our thinking is also connected with a lucid and extremely simple picture of the world: something that Diamond and Conant resolutely deny.
Technically, the principle of identity between logic and ontology can be illustrated with the help of the concept of "logical scaffolding".
15 Logical scaffoldings surround and support every newly constructed picture, or proposition; they, however, have no ontological import. They can help to bring the objects of a state of affairs -in propositions -together. Without it, the construction may be scattered, so that we cannot grasp them in the formation they now build. The point is that (i) language (and thinking) is a construction -an experimental arrangement of possible forms of objects.
16 But (ii) the objects of a state of affairs stick together thanks to their topology alone, not thanks to the logical scaffoldings. This means that there is no mortar between objects that connects them 17 -in the same way in which there are no logical constants between elementary propositions. The logical scaffoldings only support the objects in the state of affairs/proposition from outside and can be "thrown away" any time after the "experiment" of building up a new proposition is over.
Second Phase (1929-1932) (a) Wittgenstein's Logic and Ontology
After 1929, Wittgenstein's logic-ontology developed further, without losing its character as an exercise tool or ladder that brings our ability to think up to a higher level of development. Above all, his attitude to mathematics experienced 18 While in the Tractatus Wittgenstein accepted that logic has primacy over mathematics ("[m] athematics is a method of logic"), 19 in 1929 he came to believe (arguably, under Brouwer's influence) that mathematics has a primacy over logic.
In consequence, arithmetical calculus replaced the truth-functions as mediator between elementary and complex propositions. This step was supported by the discovery that from an elementary proposition we can infer other elementary propositions. For example, from "a is now red" there follows "a is now not green". In contrast, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein claimed that all complex propositions (both general and molecular) are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
Furthermore, in 1929 Wittgenstein embraced the view that the inventing of new calculi is synthetic a priori. From this point on, problems of creativity gained prominence in Wittgenstein's writings. Connected with Wittgenstein's increased interest in creativity was the change of his attention from propositions stating facts to propositions exercising force; or from indicative to imperative propositions.
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The most significant part of this transformation was that human actions were put at the centre of philosophy of language -a step further stimulated by Piero Sraffa's insistence that Wittgenstein's logic must also explain such means of communication as gestures. Now Wittgenstein elaborated a logic-ontology that not only starts from making pictures of states of affairs; it also starts from learning model-actions and language expressions. In short, he did not merely explore the problem of how we form sentences but also how we form actions.
(b) Method
In 1929-32 Wittgenstein's method developed in the direction of extensive use of analogies, comparisons, descriptions, etc., and of striving for a clear, or perspicuous, representation of all cases under examination. In these years, he also stopped exploring ideal languages and showed more interest in ordinary language: the latter is in order as it is and is not to be improved. Wittgenstein also changed his attitude to science. Whereas in the Tractatus he claimed that what can be said are only the propositions of science, in Philosophical Remarks (see its motto!) he openly criticized the method of science and opposed to it the methods of conceptual analysis. 24 propositions and thoughts are facts. A state of affairs can be articulated (delivered), without loss of information, by any fact of the same multiplicity. Apparently, multiplicity is the hinge element that connects mind (language) and reality. It secures their identity.
As noted above, after 1929 Wittgenstein added actions into his ontology and logic. We learn both language and actions in a drill. Enriching his logic-ontology in this way, the character of the hinge elements that connect logic and ontology widened considerably. The model-action and the following action have not only the same multiplicity but they also have the same method, and follow the same rule.
25 It was precisely this enrichment that caused the first substantial change in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
In short, in 1933 Wittgenstein adopted the view that philosophy is a kind of criticism of the conventional conception of thinking and intention. Words like "understanding", "meaning", "interpreting", "thinking" 26 are not inner processes; they are not processes at all. 27 In particular, they are not to be seen as a "hypothesized reservoir out of which the visible water flows". 28 We learn to use these words (concepts) in a drill. Understanding an action, or a sentence (or a word), is best demonstrated in its actual use by the person who follows the action (or learns the sentence, the word). In this sense the phrase "meaning is use" became Wittgenstein's leading mantra.
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The point is that assuming specific processes of "understanding", or "knowing", would be of no help. Indeed, if we accept that they explain our learning actions, or sentences (or words), then another jump will be needed: from "knowing" to doing. This is a typical tertium quid argument later used in Wittgenstein's paradox of rule-following: 30 we cannot articulate the unique way in which the rule is to be followed -in order to do that, we would need another rule which would show how to follow the first rule.
Ultimately 31 By way of elucidation, we would like to note that while essentialism (reductionism is one of its forms) claims that one entity determines all variants of the object under analysis, duplicationism accepts that these variants are autonomous entities. The task of the philosopher is similar to that of a judge: he judges between two parties in litigation over philosophical puzzles:
Our only task is to be just. That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of philosophy.
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More often than not, the litigation is between essentialists and duplicationists.
Our last remark will be that the new method of examining our language was a direct continuation of the Tractarian program for philosophical activity that eliminates superfluous metaphysical and logical entities and improves our ability to think and judge.
(b) Method
The second, even more substantial change in Wittgenstein's method was inaugurated at the beginning of the "Philosophy" Chapter of the Big Typescript. It can be described as follows.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein echoed Leo Tolstoy's claim that the intellectual (the man of letters) has no more knowledge than the plain man 33 -the plain man knows how things work quite well. The intellectual can simply better articulate that knowledge. That is his task and also his mission. Similarly, Wittgenstein's philosopher has two objectives: (i) to explicate this common knowledge; 34 (ii) to attend by this explication not to violate the common-sense understanding of how things work. In other words, he would not use concepts and conceptions that make sad work of the authentic intuitions of ordinary man.
Wittgenstein subscribed to these two principles in all periods of his philosophical development. His new insight in 1933 was that philosophy is not only a matter of knowledge but also of will. The point is that The very things that are most obvious can become the most difficult to understand. What has to be overcome is not a difficulty of the intellect, but of the will.
35
In fact, this insight was the ultimate turning point from what is sometimes being called the "early" Wittgenstein to the "later" Wittgenstein. It was the decisive step towards the Philosophical Investigations.
An important consequence of this change in method was that it prepared Wittgenstein's transition from seeing the role of the philosopher as an "elucidator" to seeing him as a "therapist". Indeed, in The Big Typescript and The Blue Book Wittgenstein still spoke about one method and did not mention the word "therapy". But he started to persistently claim that philosophy brings "peace of mind [Beruhigung] "; 36 that we are often caught up in philosophical "traps", or that we feel philosophical "spasms" and are to be set free from them. He also spoke about "the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits of language".
(c) Style
In contrast, in 1933-36 Wittgenstein's style of expression changed little: he widely used the dialogue form but still preserved some systematic and linear elements. Moreover, in some sections of The Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein showed a tendency to build theory. For example, he introduced the concepts "craving for generality", "family likeness" and "language-games" on one and the same page of The Blue Book. 38 The Brown Book, in its turn, advanced a consistent list of language-games, together with their elucidations and comments. 39 Another point that confirms Wittgenstein's respect for linear order in style until 1936 is that he did not stop Waismann from further work on a systematic presentation of his (Wittgenstein's) philosophy.
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All that changed in 1936, a development we shall discuss in § 4. 
The Character of the 1933 Turn
It is noteworthy that it is difficult to speak about "turns" in Wittgenstein's philosophy. In fact, his philosophical development was more evolutionary than revolutionary. Wittgenstein often employed ideas he introduced in earlier periods of his development in texts compiled after his alleged "turn". We already met this point of style in notes 25 and 26: the slogan "meaning is use" as well as the application of the tertium quid argument, which became central in Wittgenstein's method only in 1933 Wittgenstein's method only in , were already elaborated in 1930 41 Already in 1932 Wittgenstein noted: "Our method resembles psychoanalysis in a certain sense".
Our main claim here is that the revolutionary turn in Wittgenstein's thinking of 1933 was not a matter of a discovery but rather a waking up from the "dogmatic slumber" that he had fallen into while collaborating with the logical positivists of the Vienna Circle. Indeed, Wittgenstein started to speak about "calming [beruhigen]" our feelings when doing philosophy as early as 1930. 42 Even his correction of Tolstoy on the place of the will in philosophy was first made in 1931.
43 These "discoveries", however, were first ordered in a consistent method in 1933.
But what did make Wittgenstein wake up?
History of the 1933 Turn
That Wittgenstein's turn of 1933 had the character of a change in perspective is supported by its putative history which will be the subject-matter of the present sub-section. Despite the fact that Wittgenstein acknowledged influences on himself from twelve writers, today many interpreters believe that, especially after 1921, he was hardly susceptible to outside impacts, with Spengler and Sraffa being the only exceptions in this respect. Our point here is that, at least to some extent, Wittgenstein's turn of 1933 was occasioned -if not caused -by Susan Stebbings' paper "Logical Positivism and Analysis", read to the British Academy as a Henriette Hertz lecture on 22 March 1933 and shortly afterwards published as a brochure. change in his philosophy that seemed as if it had been specifically designed to face the criticism of Stebbing and Braithwaite. This change led to the transformation of his philosophy that we have already discussed in § 3(a) and can be easily traced in Wittgenstein's Lectures: Cambridge, 1932 -1935 . After lecture 26, he practically stopped speaking of "verification", "visual field", and "private language". 49 Instead, Wittgenstein devoted a great deal of space to the rejection of the private language argument and increased criticism of essentialist and reductionist conceptions in psychology and mathematics.
In the summer of 1933 Wittgenstein initiated a revision of The Big Typescript on which parts of Philosophical Grammar and the Blue Book were also based. As already seen, in these works he began to prepare his "new book", Philosophical Investigations, more especially its Urfassung (MS 142).
This turn also paid back on a didactic and social level. Soon after his conversion, Wittgenstein found devoted followers in the person of his students Rush Rhees and Francis Skinner and also of John Wisdom. Wisdom's paper " Philosophical Perplexity" (1936) , 50 in particular, was the first public evidence that Wittgenstein's turn had followers in Cambridge.
Fourth Phase
The fourth phase of the development of Wittgenstein's method was copiously prepared by him in 1936 in a long period of meditation in which he wrote his Confessions. In general, Wittgenstein was convinced that only a preliminary exercise in confessing his sins could make him hope to reach the level of sincerity needed to write good philosophy. However, Wittgenstein never applied this principle so consequentially as in the summer of 1936.
(a) Style
Unfortunately, these preparations produced more changes in style than in content. Indeed, the 1936 radical transformation affected above all Wittgenstein's form of exposition. The transformation is clearly discernible in Eine philosophische Betrachtung (the German translation and revision of the Brown Book) in which Wittgenstein's style turned polyphonic. 51 Typically, three voices take part in a dialogue on a specific philosophical problem: that of a scientist, of common sense, and of the mediator. The task of the mediator is to show the two parties that they have lost the point of the opposite side. Embracing this style of expression, Wittgenstein completely abandoned the project to present his ideas in a linear book form. Instead, he produced an "album" of such dialogues.
(b) Method
In parallel, Wittgenstein stopped speaking about "method". Instead, he was now convinced that he had "methods", or more precisely, "therapies". It is worth noticing, however, that this was an even later idea. Indeed, § 133d was added later to the Urfassung of Philosophical Investigations in autumn 1937.
53 § § 255 and 593, in which Wittgenstein spoke about "philosophical disease", were written down much later.
(c) Logic and Ontology
In respect of theory, Wittgenstein's turn brought only a few new elements. Very roughly, his anti-essentialism and anti-duplicationism radicalized further, thus transforming Wittgenstein into perhaps the most slippery of all "fishes" called philosophers.
Unfortunately -as we read in the "Preface" to Philosophical Investigations -the exposition of Wittgenstein's method still remained unsatisfactory after his turn of 1933.
Epilogue
Our concluding remark is that Wittgenstein's ceaseless efforts to elaborate a new method in philosophy was part of the project for a new, "analytic", philosophy, started by him and by Russell in 1912. 54 (Note that this project bears only a remote family likeness to what we today understand by "analytic philosophy"). 
